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les. The paper seeks to measure the effects of geographic location, especially of recruiters and stations, on enlistment supply for the 
vy and Army. In addition, the data allows an examination of inter-service competition among recruiters, including the effect of 
Location in the same station. The paper finds own-service recruiter elasticities that are comparable to those estimated in other studies. 
dso finds that the number of other-service recruiters tend to have a complementary effect on a given service’s enlistments. 
aermore, collocation of recruiters of two services in a station does not harm the recruiting success of each service. The greater the 
:rage distance between a station and the zip codes in its market tends to reduce enlistments, while the presence of a station in a zip 
le tends to have a positive effect on recruiting. These results suggest that geographic location of stations is important for recruiting 
:cess. The paper provides new evidence on the market level impact of recruiting resources, including facilities and recruiters, which 
L be used to guide decision makers in choosing geographic locations of recruiting resources. 
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ABSTRACT 
I Most previous studies of military enlistment supply have used data aggregated to a 
specific geographc level, often the recruiting district level. A major disadvantage of aggregated 
data is that the district is not the primary level at which resources are allocated or recruiting 
activities occur. Rather, recruiters are assigned to stations and each station is responsible for a set 
of zip codes, which define its market territory. Thus, existing research does not provide 
information that would assist in identifling the best geographic areas in which to locate recruiters 
or stations. This paper exploits a unique data file constructed from the basic building blocks of 
recruiting markets - zip codes. The paper seeks to measure the effects of geographic location, 
especially of recruiters and stations, on enlistment supply for the Navy and Army. In addition, the 
data allows an examination of inter-service competition among recruiters, including the effect of 
collocation in the same station. The paper finds own-service recruiter elasticities that are 
comparable to those estimated in other studies. It also finds that the number of other-service 
recruiters tend to have a complementary effect on a given service’s enlistments. Furthermore, 
collocation of recruiters of two services in a station does not harm the recruiting success of each 
service. The greater the average distance between a station and the zip codes in its market tends 
to reduce enlistments, while the presence of a station in a zip code tends to have a positive effect 
on recruiting. These results suggest that geographic location of stations is important for 
recruiting success. The paper provides new evidence on the market level impact of recruiting 
resources, including facilities and recruiters, which can be used to guide decision makers in 
choosing geographic locations of recruiting resources. 
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Economists have been interested in estimating military enlistment supply models at least 
since the advent of the all-volunteer force in 1973. In the 25 years since the AVF was launched, 
numerous econometric supply studies have been published. Goldberg (1 982) surveys studies as of 
the early 1980s, and Warner and Asch (1995) survey the literature as of the early 1990s. This 
research has yielded an impressive array of fairly consistent and usefbl results. From a labor 
economics perspective, enlistment supply models have improved our understanding of the 
behavior of youth in making post-high school occupational and schooling decisions. From a 
policy standpoint, the models have yielded measures of the relative effectiveness of alternative 
recruiting tools and incentives. From a resource management standpoint, they have provided 
practical methods for forecasting future supply. 
Most prior studies have used data aggregated to a specific geographic level, often the 
recruiting district. Recruiting districts consist of parts of large states or portions of several 
smaller states. For example, the Navy recruiting command is currently organized into 31 
geographic districts, and the Army command into 41 districts. The advantage of these data is that 
a recruiting district represents one of the important hierarchical levels in a service’s recruiting 
organization, and one where enlistment quotas are assigned and recruiting success (generally 
measured by gross contracts) is monitored closely. However, a major disadvantage of this type of 
data is that the district is not the primary level at which resources, especially recruiters, are 
allocated within recruiting organizations. 
An individual recruiter does not recruit throughout an entire district. Rather, each 
recruiter is assigned to a recruiting facility and is allowed to canvass only within that station’s pre- 
assigned geographic territory. Each station’s territory consists of a set of contiguous zip codes. 
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Results drawn from models estimated with district-level data cannot be used to analyze the 
numerous decisions that must be made within districts at the local geographic level. These 
decisions include the number and location of recruiting stations, the assignment of recruiters to 
those stations, the geographic configuration and size of each station’s territory, and the quota of 
each station. More importantly, models that use district data cannot provide estimates of the 
direct impact of the recruiting station, or more precisely, its location. 
The purpose of this paper is to exploit a unique data file constructed from the basic 
building blocks of recruiting markets, zip codes. The data file identifies the geographic location 
of stations, the recruiters assigned to each station, the market territory (zip codes) which belong 
to each station, and the enlistment contracts originating from each zip code. The major goal of 
the paper is to test hypotheses on the effects of geographic location, especially of recruiters and 
stations, on enlistment supply. For example, the data identi@ the distance that recruiters must 
travel from the recruiting station to each zip code in their market area. Greater distances increase 
the time cost of canvassing in a given zip code and, all else equal, reduce the expected number of 
contracts from that zip code. A secondary purpose of this study is to improve the efficiency of 
estimates of the standard variables, such as recruiters and local unemployment, in prior enlistment 
supply models based on aggregate data. 
One important issue that can be addressed with these data is the effect of one service’s 
recruiting efforts on another service’s enlistment contracts. Interest in the inter-service 
competition issue has been stimulated by a recent General Accounting Office (GAO, 1994) 
report recommending that the services consider consolidating more recruiters into collocated 
stations. GAO’s recommendation stems in part from the belief that individual service recruiting 
efforts are competitive, so that consolidating recruiters into joint facilities can reduce costs to 
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DOD without harming overall recruiting success. Unfortunately, evidence on this issue is limited, 
and the evidence that is available does not always support the presumption that recruiting efforts 
are competitive. Also, no previous studies have examined this issue using data disaggregated to 
the local geographic level where individual recruiters interact, often within the same station. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section I1 provides a brief review of some of the 
pertinent issues in the enlistment supply literature. Section I11 presents a brief overview of the 
theory underlying our specification. Section IV discusses the pooled data, and section V 
discusses model specification and estimation methods. Results are presented in Section VI, and 
Section VII summarizes the paper and suggests directions for the future. 
II. Literature Review 
Several prior studies have used data from a time series of cross sections to analyze 
enlistment supply. One reason for using pooled district-level data is the wealth of information 
available on recruiters, advertising, and enlistment contracts. A second reason is that in pooled 
data variation of key variables, such as military pay, civilian pay and unemployment, is greater 
than in either cross sectional or time series data alone. To deal with potential bias arising from 
demand constraints on enlistments, most studies have focused on high quality enlistments, defined 
as high school diploma graduates in AFQT test score categories I to IIIA. The assumption behind 
this approach is that the services seldom meet their quotas for high quality enlistments and 
therefore estimated parameters are more likely to represent true structural supply effects. 
A major issue in enlistment supply studies using pooled data is the effect of unobserved 
factors that vary across the cross sectional units, but that are time-invariant. In OLS estimates of 
supply models if the unobserved factors (such as propensity) are correlated with the included 
variables, parameter estimates will be biased. Examples of unobserved factors include differences 
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in underlying military propensities, command-specific factors, and recruiting effort (see Kostiuk, 
1987). One techque for eliminating the bias due to unobservable factors is to estimate fixed 
effects models (see Johnston and DiNardo, 1994). 
Brown (1985) analyzed the determinants of Army contracts using quarterly data from 
states for 1976-1982. He analyzed contract rates for four different quality groups, based on high 
school diploma and AFQT score combinations. Fixed effects models were estimated to deal with 
unobserved factors associated with states. His model specification includes only military pay, 
civilian pay, educational benefits, and unemployment rates. Prior to Brown, there had been some 
controversy over the effect of unemployment on recruitment, with some studies having found no 
effect. Brown, by contrast, found very large effects of unemployment on recruitment success, 
with elasticity estimates around .42. The elasticity of military pay was estimated to be around .50. 
The omission of recruiters from Brown’s supply model represents a potential specification 
error. In a footnote, Brown indicates that additional Army recruiters had a positive effect on 
enlistments and that additional recruiters from the other services had a negative effect. However, 
he does not present any models that include recruiters in the specification. Brown’s caution on 
this point may stem from his inability to accurately assign recruiters to states. The difficulty arises 
because states are not aligned naturally with recruiting districts. Because the author was forced to 
arbitrarily assign pro-rated shares of recruiters to each state, the number of recruiters by state is 
likely to have been measured with error, which would produce biased estimates due to the 
correlation between the included variables in the model and the error term. 
Daula and Smith (1 985) used monthly data from Army districts (battalions) pooled for the 
period from October 1980 through June 1983 to estimate high quality enlistment equations. They 
estimated standard OLS models, fixed effects models, and instrumental variables models. One of 
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their more interesting findings was that increases in the number of high quality enlistments by the 
other services had a large negative effect on the supply of Army recruits. In particular, the Army 
lost one high quality enlistee for every two to three additional other service enlistments in a 
district. The authors also divided the sample into observations drawn from supply-constrained 
environments (quota < supply) and observations from demand constrained environments (quota > 
supply) and estimated separate models for both. As expected, the effects of most determinants 
(pay, unemployment, recruiters, and advertising) were smaller for the demand-constrained sample. 
Warner (1990) reports the results of estimating supply models using quarterly data for 
1981-1987 for Navy recruiting districts. An advantage of these data is that he is able to 
incorporate district recruiting goals to control for demand constraints. He estimates separate 
models for each of the four services and incorporates the effects of each service’s own recruiters, 
other services’ recruiters (all other services are combined), own-service goals, and other service 
goals.’ 
Warner points out that the effect of district population in enlistment studies is especially 
important because each service distributes recruiters to districts primarily on the basis of 
population size. As a result, standard OLS regressions will be dominated by the positive cross 
sectional correlation between recruiters and enlistment data at a point in time and will therefore be 
biased toward finding a positive relationship between recruiters (of all services) and enlistments. 
That is, they will be biased toward finding complementarity among recruiters. Because fixed 
effects models convert the data to a within-district time series, changes in recruiters over time are 
Warner points out that there may be important difference between the effect of an increase in an individual 
service’s recruiters versus an increase in its goal. If the Navy, for example, expands recruiters without expanding 
goals, recruiters can achieve goal with less effort, which may serve to boost the other services’ contracts. But if 
Navy increases the goal for a fixed number of recruiters, Navy recruiters will be induced to work harder, which 
may damage other services’ recruiting. 
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less highly correlated, leading to improved estimates of the interservice recruiting relationship. 
Warner’s estimates reveal substantial complementarity among the services’ recruiting 
efforts: with the exception of the Marine Corps, an increase in other-service recruiters increases 
own-service contracts. The lowest cross-service elasticity was .06 for the Air Force and the 
highest was .60 for the Army. Increases in other service goals have a mixed effect: they increase 
contracts for the Navy and Air Force but reduce them for the Army.2 The effect of 
unemployment in Warner is similar to Brown’s results, with elasticities in the .40-.50 range for 
three of the services and around .20 for the Air Force. The pay elasticities varied by service 
ranging from S O  for the Army to over 2.0 for the Navy and Marine Corps. Warner also found 
that educational benefits were a major factor in improving Army and Navy recruiting success in 
the 1980s. Advertising expenditures had a consistently positive enlistment effect only for the 
Army, results that are in line with other studies of the impact of advertising. 
Ill. Background 
The traditional approach in most enlistment supply research, is to view the enlistment 
decision as an occupational choice (Goldberg, 1991). Guided by the underlying theory of 
occupational choice, and based at least implicitly on utility maximization, factors postulated to 
influence supply include the pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of employment in the Armed 
Forces relative to the next best alternative. Hence, the typical supply model is specified to include 
measures of military pay, civilian pay (representing the opportunity cost), the state of the civilian 
economy, typically measured by the unemployment rate, and other variables affecting the relative 
Note that Warner &d not have &strict-level goal information for the Air Force and Marine Corps thus creating 2 
measurement error in this variable. 
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attractiveness of military service. 
In this analysis, we do not focus on the estimation of structural parameters for the effects 
of pay, bonuses, and other recruiting resources that affect the inherent relative attractiveness of 
military service. As noted above, much of the econometric literature has been devoted to 
estimating the effects of these factors. Rather, we focus on two resources that affect enlistment 
supply largely by reducing the information costs of enlistment opportunities to potential applicants 
and the direct cost to the applicant of completing the application process. These resources are 
military recruiters and the recruiting stations from which they operate, and the geographic 
location of the stations. In this sense, we can view the analysis as that of a firm selling a 
product-in this case, employment in the armed forces. 
Military recruiters are typically included in enlistment supply equations because they 
represent the military’s sales force. They are usually found to have a positive and statistically 
significant effect on enlistments. The theory underlying the role of recruiters in enlistment supply 
is rarely articulated, however. The framework for understanding the role of recruiters is one 
where information regarding job opportunities, job characteristics, and the steps necessary to 
apply and quali@ is imperfect and costly for potential applicants. Recruiters reduce the cost of 
information regarding opportunities in the military to potential applicants and reduce the cost of 
applying for entrance to the military, which should increase the pool of potential applicants and 
the number of applicants from the pool. 
In contrast to military recruiters, the role of recruiting facilities in enlistment supply has 
not been analy~ed.~ Recruiting stations potentially increase the supply of recruits in four related 
~~ 
3 An exception to this is Bohn et al.(June 1996). 
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ways. First, the number and locations of recruiting stations may have a direct effect on recruiter 
productivity. A station serves as the office to which recruiters report, where they canvas for 
potential applicants, and where they test and process applicants. The closer the recruiter’s office is 
to potential applicants the less travel time the recruiter will incur per call and the more time that 
will be available to for essential recruiting activities. Second, recruiting stations can serve as the 
equivalent of retail outlets in that they reduce the cost to potential applicants of obtaining 
information regarding enlistment opportunities. By affecting the potential applicant’s travel time 
and direct expenses, they reduce the cost of applying. “Walk-in” traffic should be greater the 
larger the number of conveniently located outlets. Trips to the station to discuss aspects of 
military service or the application process with a recruiter are less costly to the applicant the 
closer the station is to the applicant. Third, recruiting stations themselves may be a form of 
advertising-a “billboard”-that can lower the cost of information to potential applicants. 
Finally, and related to the first reason, recruiting stations affect direct travel expenses-mileage 
costs, etc.-and the direct costs of sales production. Hence, for a given budget, lower travel 
costs mean that resources can be reallocated to other recruiting tools. 
The issue of the optimal number and location of recruiting stations and the way they 
potentially affect enlistments is related to the theory of spatial competition. This theory, based on 
Hotelling (1929) and Smithies (1941) provides the important insight that the full price of a good 
or service is equal to its nominal purchase price plus the cost to the purchaser of traveling to the 
outlet to receive the good, or the cost of having the good shipped to the purchaser. The theory of 
spatial competition provides some insight regarding where profit-maximizing firms will locate 
plants or retail outlets. It can be extended to include multiple plants or outlets, and the degree of 
-8- 
competition in the market. Elementary aspects of the theory of spatial competition suggest that 
outlets should be located in areas central to the potential customers. With respect to recruiting 
stations the simple theory suggests that, holding other factors constant, the relationship between 
enlistments and the distance between the geographic areas served by a station and the station itself 
will be negative. 
For our purposes, we test the following hypotheses: 
0 holding other factors constant, there will be a negative relationship 
the distance between a recruiting stationll have a positive effect on enlistments in the 
areas where they are located; 
the effect should be greater in areas with more potential applicants; 
recruiting stations of competing services (close substitutes to the own service) have a 




Following prior studies, this paper attempts to model behavior of male “high quality” 
enlistments-high school diploma graduates who score in the top half of the Armed Forces 
Qualifying Test (AFQT). Observed enlistments from this group are assumed to represent supply 
behavior, in that these groups are not demand constrained. Supply models are estimated for two 
separate geographic levels-the ZIP code level and the station (market) level. The analysis 
focuses on the interaction between Army and Navy recruiters. 
Most of the data on enlistment contracts is from the Army’s ATAS database, which 
provides quarterly contracts by ZIP code, from the fourth quarter of fiscal 1994 through fourth 
quarter of fiscal 1997, a total of thirteen quarters. It also includes ZIP code demographics, 
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including the 17-21 year old population, area in square miles, and the number of high schools. 
Importantly, it includes the location of the Army station that serves each ZIP code and the number 
of recruiters assigned to each station. 
Data on Navy contracts is taken from Navy’s STEAM database. This database also 
includes data regarding the number of Navy production recruiters assigned to a recruiting station 
each quarter, the ZIP codes in that station’s territory, as well as the ZIP code in which the 
recruiting station is located. In addition, we have added data on per capita income and median 
household income from the 1990 Census. This data, while available at the ZIP code level, 
provides only a cross-sectional snapshot for the period of the Census. There is no time series 
variation and the data is eliminated in fixed effects estimates. The county unemployment rate is 
also included in some specifications. 
Each service’s data identifies recruiters assigned to a given recruiting station and the ZIP 
codes assigned to that station. To measure recruiter presence in each ZIP code, we allocate each 
station’s recruiters to each zip code in the station’s territory based on the proportion of the 
population of 17-21 year olds in each ZIP to the total population in the station’s market area: 
ZIPpopl7 - 2 1 
Stationpopl7 - 2 1 
ZI Pr ecruiters = Stationrecruiters * 
We believe that this distribution is preferred to assigning all of the station’s recruiters to every ZIP 
code in its market territory in that it accounts for the competing demand for a recruiter’s time 
across the ZIP codes assigned to a station. 
We construct estimated distances from each ZIP code in a station’s territory based on the 
radial distances between the centroid of the ZIP code and the centroid of the ZIP code where the 
recruiting station is located (centroids are identified by latitude and longitude). For those ZIP 
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codes where the facility is located, the distance is calculated as the radius of a circle with the same 
area as that of the ZIP code. 
Finally, the Army and Navy identified the ZIP code in which their respective recruiting 
stations are located. This information was used to construct a third variable indicating whether 
both Army and Navy have a station in a given ZIP code. We interpret this to be a “co-located” or 
“joint” recruiting station, though we do not know with certainty that they are located in the same 
b~ilding.~ 
Table 1 provides a brief glossary of variable definitions. Descriptive statistics for our data 
are shown in the following tables. Table 2 contains the means and standard deviations for the ZIP 
code-level Army data and Table 3 displays the means and standard deviations for the Navy data. 
Table 4 provides the definitions of the variables measured in logarithms. Table 5 presents means 
of the logs of the ZIP code level data. In Tables 6 and 7, the means and standard deviations for 
the station-level models, in log form, are presented for the Army and Navy, respectively. 
~ 
DOD policies generally prevent any two services from leasing separate facilities in close proximity to each other. 4 
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Table 1: Glossary of Variables 
Variable Name Description 
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Area covered by ZIP code or station in square miles 
Dummy for Army station in ZIP code 
Distance to ZIP of Army station from centroid of ZIP 
Distance to ZIP of Navy station from centroid of ZIP 
Dummy for FY 96 
Dummy for exactly I high school in ZIP 
Dummy for 2 or more high schools in ZIP 
Interaction of dummy for 1 or more high schools in ZIP with number f Army re ruiters 
Interaction of dummy for 1 or more high schools In ZIP With number of Navy recruiters 
Interaction of dummy for 1 or more high schools In ZIP with dummy for Army station in ZIP 
Interaction of dummy for 1 or more high schools in ZIP with dummy for Navy station in ZIP 
Dummy for Army and Navy stations in same ZIP 
Dummy for Navy station in ZIP 
Navy male I-IIIA HS diploma grads 
Per-capita Income from 1990 census 
Population of 17-21 year olds 
Population density of 17-21 year olds 
Number of prorated Army recruiters by population in ZIP 
Number of prorated Navy recruiters by population In ZIP 
Square of prorec-a 
Square of prorec-n 
Dummy for 2nd fiscal quarter 
Dummy for 3rd fiscal quarter 
Dummy for 4th fiscal quarter 
Interaction of prorated Army recruiters with 17-21 year old population 
Interaction of prorated Navy recruiters with 17-21 year old population 
Interaction of prorated Army recruiters with per-capita In me 
Interaction of prorated Navy recruiters with per-capita Income 
Ratio of Army recruiters at a station to the 17-21 year old population that their station serves 
Interaction of Army station dummy with per-capita Income 
Interaction of Navy station dummy with per-capita Income 
Interaction of Army station dummy with 17-21 year old population 
Interaction of Navy station dummy with 17-21 year old population 
Interaction of Army station dummy with suburban dummy 
Interaction of Navy station dummy with suburban dummy 
Interaction of Army station dummy with urban dummy 
Interaction of Navy station dummy with urban dummy 
Interaction of Army station dummy with number of prorated Army recruiters 
Interaction of Navy station dummy with number of prorated Navy recruiters 
Interaction of suburban dummy with number of prorated Army recruiters 
Interaction of suburban dummy with number of prorated Navy recruiters 
Dummy for suburban ZIP 
County unemployment rate 
Dummy for urban ZIP 
Interaction of urban dummy with number of prorated Army recruiters 
URBREC-N Interaction of urban dummy with number of prorated Navy recruiters 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Army ZIP LevelData 
Variable Mean Std Dev 












N STATZ I P 
JO INTZIP 
















0.5567 1 .I436 
0.3687 0.8624 
1.61 76 12.91 40 
0.8796 7.1216 
7541.2600 15651.9600 
965.01 05 5737. I900 
0.1 144 0.7495 
0.3577 1.0826 
0.1222 0.521 3 
0.4073 1.0679 





0.0395 0.1 947 
0.021 3 0.1443 
0.0529 0.2238 
41 7.9071 754.9784 
107.2245 388.3624 
54.0096 212.0492 









Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Navy ZIP Level Data 
Variable Mean Std Dev 
NV-GSMA 0.2851 0.7924 
PROREC-A 0.5567 1 A436 
PROREC-N 0.3687 0.8624 
PRORECA2 1.61 76 12.91 40 
PRORECN2 0.8796 7.1216 
RECINC-N 4991.9000 121 38.8000 
RC-POP-N 681.3250 4229.4300 
STZREC-N 0.0608 0.4901 
URBREC-N 0.2474 0.8163 
SUB RE C-N 0.0757 0.3660 
HSREC-N 0.2689 0.7922 
ASTATZ I P 0.061 5 0.2402 
NSTATZIP 0.0534 0.2248 
JO I NTZl P 0.0435 0.2040 
STZl P 0 P N 74.0224 457.7097 
STZl N C-N 749.8068 331 9.7800 
STZPURBN 0.0360 0.1863 
STZPSUBN 0.01 69 0.1289 
HSSTZ-N 0.0453 0.2080 
POP17 417.9071 754.9784 
AREA 107.2245 388.3624 
POPDEN 54.0096 21 2.0492 
DISTAR2 41.0314 56.6939 
DISTNAV 46.5696 73.0890 
PERCAPIN 12608.9800 5860.8600 
URATE 0.0561 0.0245 
URBAN 0.2884 0.4530 
SUBURB 0.1434 0.3505 
HSI 0.41 47 0.4927 
HS2 0 0896 0.2855 
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Table 4: Definition of Log Variables 
Variable Name Description 
















' LN U RATE 
Log of Army male I-IIIA HS diploma grads 
Log of population-weighted average distance to Army station from ZlPs served by that station 
Log of population-weighted average distance to Navy station from ZlPs served by that station 
Log of distance to ZIP of Army station from centroid of ZIP 
Log of distance to ZIP of Navy station from centroid of ZIP 
Log of distance to Army station from nearest Navy station (station-level model only) 
Log of distance to Navy station from nearest Army station (station-level model only) 
Log of Navy male I-IIIA HS diploma grads 
Log of per-capita income from 1990 census 
Log of population of 17-21 year olds 
Log of prorated number of Army recruiters in ZIP of Navy station (station-level model only) 
Log of prorated number of Navy recruiters in ZIP of Army station (station-level model only) 
Log of prorated number of Army recruiters in ZIP 
Log of prorated number of Navy recruiters in ZIP 
Log of number of high schools in ZIP 
Log of county unemployment rate 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Army and Navy ZIP 
Level Semi-Log Models 
Variable Mean Std Dev 







































1 .OM947 1 
1.1292344 





HS2 0.0895562 0.2855453 
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for 
Army Station-Level Model 
Variable Mean Std Dev 
LNARGSMA 1.8363 0.7763 
LNPOP 17 8.7456 0.765 1 
LNAREA 6.4152 1.6009 
NSTATZP 0.6029 0.4893 
LNDISTNV 1.8515 1.2695 
LNAVDSTA 2.75 16 0.7784 
LNPRORCN -0.4076 2.0362 
URBAN 0.6424 0.4793 
SUBURB 0.3456 0.4756 
LNURATE -2.9883 0.4240 
LNTOTHS 2.2924 0.6061 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for Navy 
Station-Level Model 
Variable Mean Std Dev 




























LNTOTHS 2.6708 0.61 18 
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V. Model Specification and Estimation 
We pool cross-sections over time to estimate the models. We specify the model in two 
general ways: (1) the unit of observation is the ZIP code level, and (2) the unit of observation is 
the recruiting station. In the first specification, the dependent variable is the number of high 
quality male enlistment contracts obtained from a ZIP code in a given quarter. This number will 
generally be small, and often zero. Hence, log-log formulations are problematic. 
Our first specification of the ZIP code model is as a “level” model, with non-linearity 
introduced through quadratic and interaction terms. We attempt to specify the model to be 
flexible, with quadratic and interaction terms for the two key variables--recruiters and an indicator 
of whether there is a recruiting station in the ZIP code. The following is the general form of this 
specification: 
where E,,&, is enlistment contracts for services from ZIP code z at time t, “Rec” is recruiters, Pop 
is population, Inc is per capita income, DStation is a dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a 
recruiting station in the ZIP code and Durban is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ZIP code is in 
an urban area. Dist is the distance between the centroid of the ZIP code and the centroid of the 
~ 
station to which the ZIP code is a~signed.~ DStationk,, is a dummy variable indicating that 
If the recruiting station is in the ZIP code, the distance is calculated as the radius of a circle with the same area. 
another Service’s recruiting station is in the ZIP code. We also include other Services’ recruiters 
in the equation (Recos,z,t), but without the interactions that were included for the own Service 
recruiters. DHS1 is a dummy variable indicating that there is at least one high school in the ZIP, 
and DHS2 is a dummy variable indicating that there are two or more high schools in the ZIP code. 
One would anticipate that the Services are in competition so that, other things being equal, an 
increase in other Services’ recruiters would reduce enlistments to the own Service.6 
The effect of the recruiting stations location on enlistments is measured in two ways. 
First, a dummy variable indicating whether the Service has a recruiting station located in the ZIP 
code is included, along with interactions that allow the effect of the recruiting station to vary with 
the characteristics of its location and recruiter productivity to vary based on the existence of a 
station in the ZIP code. Second, the distance between the centroid of the ZIP code and the 
recruiting station to which it is assigned is included. This model is estimated separately for the 
Army and Navy using ordinary least squares. 
We also specify a semi-log model of the form: 
where X is a vector of explanatory variables. It is estimated by taking natural logarithms of both 
sides. The quadratic and interaction terms are dropped in this specification. In both models we 
include dummy variables indicating Army battalions or Navy recruiting districts to which each ZIP 
code is assigned, and dummy variables for quarter and fiscal year. The inclusion of these 
In practice, we include only Army and Navy recruiters. 
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variables attempts to control for fixed effects, whether cross-sectional or over time, that may 
affect the estimates, and to control for omitted factors that vary over time, such as military pay 
and other recruiting resources. The coefficients of these variables are not reported in the tables 
below, but are available on request. 
It is important to note that the effect of recruiting stations on enlistments may be biased in 
this specification. The reason is that the military may locate stations in ZIP codes from which 
enlistments have historically been especially productive. If so, the recruiting station indicator 
variable may be correlated with omitted variables affecting enlistments, biasing upward the 
estimated effect of stations on enlistments. 
To control for this, we apply two alternative methods. The first is a fixed effects model in 
which each ZIP code level variable is measured as the difference from its ZIP code specific mean 
over the time period of the analysis. Variables that do not change over time, such as an indicator 
of “urban” or “suburban” location, simply drop out. But, this also means that unless there was a 
change in the status of a recruiting station within a ZIP code over the time period, the values for 
the recruiting station variable within that ZIP code are zero. Hence, this specification has the 
advantage that the effect of, for example, station location on enlistments is based on observations 
from ZIP codes in which there was a change in status over the three year period. That is, only 
station openings or closing during the time period will have an effect on enlistments. The 
disadvantage is the fixed effects specification greatly reduces the power of the test for recruiting 
station effects on enlistment supply. Though the pooled time series-cross section data contains in 
excess of 250,000 observations, openings and closings of recruiting stations are rare events within 
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a short time series such as 0u1-s.~ This is an important limitation to recognize because, while it is 
reasonable to expect that the number and location of recruiting stations will affect enlistments, it 
is also likely that the effect will be modest relative to resources such as recruiters or relative pay. 
Hence, the true effect may be positive but small in magnitude in our data. 
The second general specification is as a station level model. The dependent variable is the 
quarterly contracts from the station’s territory, i.e., those ZIP code assigned to a given recruit 
station. An advantage of this specification is that we do not have to use arbitrary methods to 
assign recruiters to ZIP codes. A disadvantage is that it does not permit us to estimate a recruit 
station location effect directly. However, the coefficient on the recruiter variable in this model 
provides an estimate of the effect of station size. 
We specifjr quarterly enlistments at the recruiting station as a function of the number of 
own-Service recruiters assigned to the station, the number of other-Service recruiters allocated to 
the ZIP code in which the recruiting station resides, the characteristics of the station’s territory, 
including area, population of 17-21 years old, and number of high schools. We also include a 
variable indicating whether the other Service has a recruiting station in the same ZIP code for 
which the own Service recruiting station is located, a variable indicating the distance from the 
centroid of the ZIP code in which the recruiting station is located to the centroid of the ZIP code 
for the nearest other Service recruiting station, and a distance variable that is the population- 
weighted average distance from all ZIP codes assigned to a station: 
DOD policies require that once a station is opened that it remain open for at least 3 years. 
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Dist, = ZIPpopl7 - 21,,i D i ~ t , , ~  IC ZIPpopl7 - 21 z,1 
where Dist; is the distance measure for the station and Dist,; is the radial distance from ZIP code z 
to its assigned recruiting station i. The population weighted distance variable provides an 
indication of average travel distances within a station’s territory. A decrease in the number of 
recruiting stations increases the average value of the variable. 
We estimate the model as a log-log model of the form: 
InE,,i,t = a + /?, lnRec,,i,t + p2 Rec, ,, i t  + p3 lnPopl7 - 21i,t + P,Area,,, + B,DStation, ,, 
+ /?6DistOS,i,t + B,Dists,i,t + ... + &s,i,t 
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VI. Results for ZIP Code Models 
We present results first for the ZIP code level models and then the station models, for both 
the Army and the Navy. ZIP code models for the Army are presented in Table 8. The last column 
(labeled “Implied elasticity”) reports elasticities, at the means, for some key continuous variables. 
Interactions are included in the elasticity calculations. 
If there are dummy variables in the interaction, they are included at the sample mean for 
the dummy variable in the computation. For dummy variables-- such as ASTATZIP (an Army 
recruiting station in the ZIP code)-the effect of increasing the variable from 0 to 1 is reported. 
Interactions with continuous variables are computed at the mean of the continuous variable, for 
the dummy variables. 
The “own” recruiter effect implies an elasticity of about 0.42, which is consistent with 
elasticities in prior studies. Note that Army recruiters are more productive in ZIP codes with high 
schools (HSREC-A), but apparently are not more productive, at the margin, in ZIP codes with 
recruiting stations (STZREC-A). The effect of Navy recruiters on Army enlistments is small, but 
positive and statistically significant. Taken literally, a 10% increase in Navy recruiters will result in 
a 0.3% increase in Army male high quality enlistments, suggesting some complementarity. An 
Army recruiting station in a ZIP code is worth about 0.26 high quality male enlistments per 
quarter in that ZIP code. (This calculation includes all interaction effects). However, a Navy 
station in the ZIP code adds about 0.45 additional high quality Army recruits. This result is 
counterintuitive and may be due to omitted variable bias.‘ If there are both Army and Navy 
stations in the ZIP the net effect is 0.18, which is less than the sum of the two independent effects 
-22- 
(see JOINTZIP), but greater than for each individually. This provides some support for a policy 
encouraging collocation of recruiting stations. 
Distance from each ZIP code to its assigned Army recruiting station has a negative effect 
on Army enlistments. Interpreted literally, a 10% increase in the average distance between the 
centroid of the ZIP code and its assigned recruiting station results in about a 0.3% decline in 
enlistments. The effect of distance from a Navy recruiting station on Army enlistments is not 
statistically significant. All else equal, ZIP codes with higher per capita income are associated 
with lower enlistments. The elasticity is -0.15. The unemployment rate elasticity is about 0.14, 
which is somewhat lower than is typically found in the literature (using district data). 
* When we estimate essentially the same model, but without interaction effects, we do obtain a larger effect for the 
Army station on Army enlistments than for the Navy station on Army enlistments. 
-23 - 








Variable Std Frror T-stat Flasticitv Fs ti m ate . .  
INTERCEP 
P R 0 REC-A 
PR 0 REC-N 
P R OR ECA2 
PRORECN2 
R EC I N C-A 
R C-P 0 P-A 
STZR EC-A 
U R B R EC-A 
































































































































The results for the ZIP code level Navy model are shown in Table 9. The effect of Navy 
recruiters on Navy enlistments, including the interaction effects, implies an elasticity of about 
0.23. This is lower than generally is found in the literature, but is consistent with the 0.3 elasticity 
found in a recent study of Navy recruiting by Hogan, Dall and Mackin (1996). Navy recruiters 
are more productive in areas where there is a Navy recruiting station and where there are high 
schools, according to these results. Army recruiters have a positive effect on Navy enlistments, 
also suggesting complementarity. Though the elasticity is only slightly less than that for Navy 
recruiters, the marginal effect of an Army recruiter on Navy enlistments is about half of the effect 
of a Navy recruiter on Navy enlistments. 
The effect of a Navy recruiting station in a ZIP code on Navy enlistments is substantial. 
Taken literally, the presence of a station increases high quality male contracts by almost 0.43 per 
quarter. An Army station in the ZIP code results in about 0.2 additional high quality Navy 
recruits per quarter. Increased distances from the centroid of the ZIP code to both Navy and 
Army stations have negative effects on Navy enlistments, though the larger effect for the Army 
distance suggests, again, omitted variable bias rather than a causal factor. Areas with greater per 
capita income are associated with lower Navy enlistments, all else being equal. The measured 
elasticity is small, about -0.08. The unemployment elasticity is also a modest -0.10. 
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Table 9: Navy Production at the ZIP Code Level 
Mean dependent  0.2851 
Ad ju s ted R-sq u a re 0.201 6 
R-sq u are 0.2021 
Var iable  
P a r a m e t e r  Im pl ied 
Es t imate  S t d  Error  T-s ta t E las t i c  ity 
I N T E R C E P  0 .040472  0 .0199  2 .038  
P R O  R EC-A 0 .1  1 1 9 0 6  0.0065 17 .322  0 .2185 
P R O R  EC- N 0 .262039  0 .0269  9 .731 0 .2277  
P R O R E C N 2  0 .003279  0 .001  1 2 .912 
P R O R E C A 2  - 0 .003616  0 .0005 -7.84 1 
R E C  INC-N -0 . O  0 0 00  0 5 5  5 0 . 0 0 0 0  -1 .055 
RC-PO P-N - 0 .00001 7844  0 . 0 0 0 0  -8.629 
S T Z R E C - N  0 . 0 2 5 2 6 1  0 .0099 2 .564  
U R BR EC- N -0.19 1 5 3 2  0 .0257  -7.459 
S U B R E C - N  -0 .221069 0 .0266  -8 .298 
H S R E C - N  0 .0231 7 9  0 .0061  3.770 
1 5 . 1  0 1  A S T A T Z I P  0 .2051 8 6  0 .0136 
N S T A T Z I P  0 . 5 7 4 5 3  0 .2176  2 .641 0 .4266  
JO  INTZ IP  -0.0 3 7 2 4  7 0 .0255  -1 .458 
S T Z l P  0 P N  -0.00 00  9 34  1 4 0 .0000  -7 .459 
S T Z l N  C-N -0 .O 0 0 00  7 0 2 3  0 . 0 0 0 0  -3 .330 
S T Z P U R B N  -0.32 0 3 6 4  0 .2141  -1.497 
S T Z P  S U B N -0.2 9 7 3 4  8 0 .2145  -1 .386 
H S S T Z - N  0 . 2 2 7 3 5 9  0 .0273  8 .31  3 
P O P 1 7  0 .000086188  0 .0000  9 .541 
A R E A  0 . 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 6 5  0 . 0 0 0 0  0 .353  
P O P D E N  -0 .000159 0 .0000  -1 5.543 
D IS T A R 2  - 0 .00021  7 0 .0001  -3 .746 -0 .O 3 1 2  
D I S T N A V  -0.00 006  9 0 .0000  -1 .476 -0.01 13  
-0 . O O  000  1 7 9  1 0 .0000  -3 .677 -0 .0792 P E R C A P I N  
U R A T E  0 .534403  0 . 0 9 7 8  
U R B A N  0 .28224  1 0 . 0 0 8 1  34 .661  
S U B U R B  0 .171679  0 .0084  20 .383 
H S I  0 . 0 3 6 6 7 7  0 . 0 0 5 0  7 .293  
0 .0092  24 .040  H S 2  0 .221 1 6 7  
Q 2  0 .037321  0 .0064  5 .818 
Q 3  0 .032373  0 .0059  5 .494  
Q 4  0 .0691 2 2  0 .0059  11 .657  
C O N T Q U A R  - 0 .002791  0 .0007 -3 .728 
F Y  96  0 0 1 7 9 4 6  0 0 0 4 4  7 9 6 8  
5 .464  0.1 052  
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In Table 10, we present the results of a semi-log model of Army enlistments at the ZIP 
code level. The implied Army recruiter elasticity is about 0.37, which is comparable to the 0.42 
estimate from Table 8. The effect of Navy recruiters on Army enlistments is insignificant in this 
specification. We find that an Army station within the ZIP code adds about 0.55 high quality male 
recruits per q ~ a r t e r . ~  A Navy station in the ZIP adds about 0.34 high quality recruits per quarter, 
on average. 
Table 10: Semi-Log Model of ZIP Code Level Army Enlistments 
Mean dependent 







L N R E C-A 
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FY96 0011306 0 0055 7 044 
In a semi-log formulation, the effect of a dummy variable is simply the coefficient. Consider: 
CD 
eE = Re cBe 
equal to 1 or zero. 
. Then, ,!? = B In Re c + CD , where C is the coefficient on the dummy variable, D, which is 
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Table 1 1 presents the results of the semi-log ZIP code level specification for the Navy. 
The major anomaly in these results is that Army recruiters appear to have a larger effect on Navy 
enlistments than do Navy recruiters. The implied elasticity for Army recruiters is about the same 
as it was in Table 9. However, the measured elasticity with respect to Navy recruiters is 
substantially lower in this specification. 
Table 11: Semi-Log Model of ZIP Code Level Navy Enlistments 
M e a n  dependent  
R - sq  u a  re 




Parameter  Im pl ied 
Va  r ia b I e Fs t imate  Std Frror  T-stat  F lasticitv . .  
INTERCEP 0.104262 0.0801 1 .301  
LNREC-A 0.06 1263  0.0056 10 .940  0.21 49 
LNREC-N 0.014493 0.0039 3.736 0 .0508 
A S  TAT2 IP 0 .260524 0.0160 16 .322  0.91 3 7  
NSTATZIP 0 .282533 0.0223 12 .696  0 .9909  
JO INTZlP -0.060191 0.0279 -2.161 -0.21 11 
LN POP1 7 0.037588 0.0063 5 .940 0 .1318  
LNAREA 0.017615 0.0022 8.089 0 .0618  
LNDIST-A 0 .00831 1 0.0043 1 .914 0 .0291  
LN P C A P l N  0 .00844 0.0072 1.176 0.0296 
LNURATE 0.0371 5 5  0.0057 6 .473 0.1 3 0 3  
U R B A N  0.203553 0.0097 21.022 0.71 39  
SUBURB 0.038409 0.0078 4 .908 0 .1347  
H S 2  0.1 05228 0.01 07  9.855 0 .3690  
Q 2  0.028922 0.0066 4 .400 
Q 3  0 .028556 0.0060 4 .724 
Q 4  0.059979 0.0061 9 .897 
F Y 9 6  0 0 1 1 5 8 5  0 0043 7 683 
LNDIST-N -0,02073 0.0041 -5.1 1 8  -0 .0727 
H S I  -0.00471 1 0.0050 -0.938 -0 ,0165 
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We are concerned that the estimated effect of a recruiting station in the ZIP code on 
enlistments may be the result of omitted variable bias in the level models. Other variables, such as 
recruiters, may also be subject to bias from this source. However, in the case of recruiters, we 
have a significant literature from which to judge the reasonableness of the estimated effect. In the 
case of recruiting stations, there are no previous estimates to provide a baseline. 
In Table 12, we present the results of estimating a fixed effects model for the Army. Note 
that the Army recruiter variable is in per capita terms and that other Service recruiters are 
omitted. The marginal effect of recruiters on high quality male enlistments, in this specification, is 
not measured with precision. However, the effect of an Army recruiting station in the ZIP code 
on Army enlistments is statistically significant. According to the fixed effects estimates, a station 
adds only about 0.1 high quality recruit per quarter to the ZIP code, a smaller effect than in the 
level models. 
Table 12: Army ZIP Code Level Fixed Effects Model 
cpe86fieot TSt a 
I N T E R C W  -0.05906 -12.53 
FECPPOP 1 2.59764 1.65 
POP1 7 0.00002 3.52 
DISTAR;! 0.00013 0.76 
ASTATZIP 0.10742 3.43 
URAE 0.64998 3.75 
HS1 0.00839 0.24 
HS2 0.00430 0.09 
The results of estimating recruiting station level models for the Army and for the Navy are 
reported in Tables 13 and 14, respectively. The models are estimated as log-log models, so that 
the coefficients on the continuous variables are also elasticities. 
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The estimated effect of recruiters on Army enlistments in this model is large. From Table 
14, the Army recruiter elasticity is about 0.86, which is larger than most estimates in the 
literature, and larger than the ZIP code level estimates presented above (see table xx). The point 
estimate of the effect of Navy recruiters on Army enlistments is negative, but is estimated 
imprecisely. Whether there is a Navy recruiting station in the same ZIP code as the Army station 
(NSTATZIP) does Army enlistments. However, an increase in the area that Army recruiters must 
cover, as weighted by the distribution of population (LNAVDSTA), reduces enlistments, other 
things being equal. 
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INTERCEP -0.70048 1 0.1 966 -3.563 
LNREC-AR 0.86329 0.0261 33.049 
LNPOP17 0.095637 0.01 79 5.340 
LNAREA 0.0881 44 0.01 09 8.078 
NSTATZI P 0.01 01 95 0.0269 0.380 
LNDISTNV -0.002655 0.01 25 -0.213 
L N AVD STA -0.081 793 0.0255 -3.204 
LNPRORCN -0.005508 0.0047 -1,180 
URBAN 0.01 21 59 0.0745 0.1 63 
SUBURB 0.033526 0.0682 0.492 
LN U RATE 0.024967 0.0237 1.055 
LNTOTHS -0.0373 0.0203 -1.840 
Q2 0.125312 0.0231 5.41 4 
Q3 0.1 18494 0.021 8 5.447 
Q4 0.303688 0.021 8 13.936 
CONTQUAR -0.001 178 0.0027 -0.432 
0 001417 0 O f 5 9  0.089 
The results of estimating a similar station model for the Navy are presented in Table 15. 
Navy recruiters are also estimated to have relatively large effect on enlistments. The elasticity of 
0.44 is larger than that estimated for the ZIP code level models. Army recruiters have a small, but 
positive and statistically significant effect on Navy enlistments. The effect is somewhat less than 
the effectin the ZIP code models in Table 9. In the case of the Navy, the average distance variable 
(LNAVDSTN) is positive, i.e., the “wrong” sign. 
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Vn r * W b  F M P  Std Frrnr 
INTERCEP -1.921 146 0.3894 -4.933 
LNREC-NV 0.441 336 0.0240 18.378 
LNPOP17 0.27453 1 0.0247 11.111 
LNAREA 0.032593 0.0123 2.658 
ASTATZIP 0.018349 0.0334 0.550 
L N AV DST N 0.072857 0.0271 2.693 
LNPRORCA 0.022 109 0.0102 2.165 
URBAN 0.40271 8 0.3262 1.235 
SUBURB 0.295894 0.3241 0.913 
LN U RATE 0.114116 0.0272 4.1 88 
LNTOTHS 0.049236 0.0269 1.831 
Q2 0.164885 0.0277 5.949 
Q3 0.123253 0.0263 4.681 
Q4 0.262714 0.0263 10.001 
1 6  
T-&t 
LN Dl STAR -0.013054 0.0169 -0.773 
CONTQUAR -0.01 2677 0.0031 -4.096 
Vm. Summary 
In this paper we estimated enlistment supply models for the Army and the Navy at the ZIP 
code level and at the recruiting station level. Our analysis focuses on the effects of recruiters and 
recruiting stations on enlistment supply, and the factors that affect the productivity of these 
resources at the local level. In general, we estimate own Service recruiting elasticities that are 
generally consistent with the literature. Our estimates indicate that other Service recruiting 
resources do not have a large, negative effect on a given Service’s recruiting success. There is 
relatively robust econometric evidence that Army recruiters have a positive effect on Navy 
enlistments. There is also evidence that Navy recruiters have a positive influence on Army 
enlistments, though it is less robust. 
-32- 
The Service’s own recruiting station appears to have a positive and statistically significant 
effect on the Service’s enlistments in the ZIP code in which they are located. In the case of the 
Army, we tested whether these measured effects may be due to omitted variable bias or 
endogeneity of the recruit station location choice. The result--a positive and statistically 
significant effect-- is robust to estimation using fixed effects. For both the Army and the Navy, 
distance from the recruiting station appears to have a negative effect on enlistments. 
In the station models, the own Service recruiter elasticity is greater than the elasticity in 
the ZIP code level models. This may be due to error introduced in allocating recruiters to ZIP 
codes in the ZIP code level models. 
The results reported here provide solid evidence of the importance of both recruiters and 
recruiting stations on enlistment supply. Moreover, they suggest that other Service recruiters 
have either neutral or positive effects on enlistments. However, the point estimates of effects vary 
significantly with the specification. A focus of our research in the near term will be to evolve to a 
“best” specification and to better understand why the point estimates vary with the specification. 
In the intermediate term, we hope to provide a richer specification by including additional 
data. For example, we would like to be able to characterize the recruiting station’s location as a 
storefront or retail location, or an office location. Does distance to the Military Entrance 
Processing Stations (MEPS) affect enlistment supply? Finally, in the longer term, the ZIP code 
level and recruiting level approach to analyzing enlistment supply provides an opportunity to 
examine some interesting general questions regarding military recruiting. For example, does 
proximity to a military installation affect recruiting? If so, does it matter which Service is located 
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